



POLICY

5 February 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NFIB WORKING GROUP FOR REVIEW OF  
SECURITY STANDARDS FOR PERSONNEL CLEARANCES

SUBJECT: Investigative Standards for Access to National Foreign  
Intelligence (NFI)

The NFIB Working Group for Review of Security Standards for Personnel Clearances has been instructed to proceed with the creation of a new DCID for security standards for access to non-compartmented intelligence information, and, to determine the cost of implementing such a directive.

Implementation cost cannot be determined with available information. In the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), it can only be estimated that about 50 percent of the personnel (about 1800) will require access to National Foreign Intelligence (NFI).

Currently, 1,414 personnel assigned to the OSD have access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI). The cost of upgrading background investigations for personnel who must meet the new standard cannot be determined until the new standard is defined.

Within the OSD, if 400 personnel in addition to those now meeting DCID 1/14 standards were to require access to NFI, the immediate cost could be estimated at \$120,400.00 based on the following formula:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \text{Estimated BI Cost} & \times & \text{Number of Personnel} = \text{Cost} \\ (\$301) & & (400) \qquad \qquad \$120,400.00 \end{array}$$

(Estimated BI cost was derived from the average computed by adding SBI cost (\$394) and the standard BI cost (\$208) and dividing by 2.)

The variables in cost estimates are many and the figures used are based upon statistical studies, order of magnitude estimates, and DIS-wide data incorporating all operations and maintenance factors and costs of all personnel assigned. Inflation has not been factored-in nor has there been an attempt to distinguish costs of particular investigative elements within the scope of each type of investigation.

From a department-wide standpoint, it must be argued that implementation of the proposed new DCID within the DOD will be difficult because:

On file OSD release instructions apply.

- It will be impossible to determine the number of personnel requiring such access with any degree of accuracy. Every organization and unit is in a different situation and there is an infinite number of variables that apply. At a headquarters, the number can be determined more easily. But, in a tactical unit, the number will vary depending on:

- type of unit;
- mission of the unit;
- type of personnel assigned;
- circumstances, e.g., peace, crisis, war.

Thus in order to determine the number requiring such access, each staff element and operational unit must be examined and its intelligence needs analyzed in the light of the proposed new system of compartmentation.

- Establishment of standards of investigation and adjudication for access to NFI creates a third standard. Granted, it will be uniform and should ensure reciprocity and better protection. However, it could be confusing, complicate the investigative process and will add an additional control burden on organizations that need and use intelligence.

- It will be costly. Theoretically, costs should not constrain security procedures considered necessary but they do. Costs of a third standard will add to:

- the cost of control procedures;
- the cost of investigations;
- the degradation of service by DIS to the rest of the DOD.


In summary, our argument is not based on cost reduction exclusively. It has been balanced with the care required to assure no significant lessening of security or, alternatively, to assure an acceptable level of risk. Various levels of sensitivity are related to degrees of acceptability of risk which may warrant differences in aspects of security programs including scope of investigations.

One final point, in the DOD we must separate the aspect of suitability for employment from eligibility for access to classified information. Unless access is so inextricably involved in the nature of a position, the security clearance decision must be considered separately from the decision concerning employment. In that regard, the DOD is different from many other members of the Intelligence Community.

It is recommended that this Working Group propose a standard for NFI access that:

- Adds the smallest possible number of additional elements to the scope of a standard DOD background investigation, and ,
- Exhorts the community to minimize the number of personnel with access to make the program as cost effective as possible.

Some statistical data is attached that might assist for discussion purposes only. Figures displayed were accurate on dates indicated.

  
Maynard Anderson  
Deputy Director  
Security Policy

Attachments  
a/s

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATISTICS

(Valid May 1978)

DoD Population	3,043,546
Military	2,060,400
Civilian	983,146
DoD Clearances	1,500,000
DoD Personnel with access to intelligence (estimated)	250,000
DoD Personnel with Top Secret Access (estimated)	120,000
DoD Personnel with access to SCI	100,000
OSD Population	3,616
OSD Personnel with access to intelligence (estimated)	1,800
OSD Personnel with access to Top Secret	(Cannot be determined without individual file review)
OSD Personnel with SCI access	1,414

DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

COST PER TYPE OF DIS INVESTIGATION

FY 1978

Special Background Investigation	\$394.00
Special Background Investigation-Bring Up (Limited Case)	\$108.00
Standard Background Investigation	\$208.00
Standard Background Investigation (Bring-Up)	\$178.00
Expanded National Agency Check	\$ 60.00
National Agency Check	\$ 3.57

DIS INVESTIGATIVE EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF THE OSDFY 1978

	1ST QUARTER	2ND QUARTER	3RD QUARTER	4TH QUARTER	TOTAL
NAC/ENTNAC	65	58	94	92	309
Expanded NAC	0	1	6	1	8
BI	52	100	137	63	352
SBI	47	62	34	30	173
Bring-Up	17	23	19	21	80
Total	181	244	290	207	922
Additional Inquiry	1	7	1	2	11
Limited Inquiry	-	-	1	-	1
Grand Total	182	251	292	209	934